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Abstract: This paper is a brief review on the book ‘Capital in the Twenty-First Century’ by the French scholar Thomas Piketty. 
The book has started a new debate about inequality and capital taxation in Europe. It provides interesting empirical facts and 
develops a theory of the functioning of capitalist economies. However, I personally think the book is less convincing than 
recognized in the public debate. The demonstrated theory of economic growth in the book is elusive and lacks a psychological 
and behavioral underpinning. In fact, I do think that the increasing inequality and economic divergence are caused by capitalism 
but the psychological and behavioral aspects of humans are of similar or greater significance. Therefore, Piketty’s argument does 
not stimulate an open and scientifically founded debate in all aspects. 
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1. Introduction 
The book ‘Capital In The Twenty-First Century’ by Thomas 
Piketty is recognized as one of the big surprises in the recent 
book market. The book has nearly 700 pages, but despite its 
length and bulky social and economic topic, it is discussed in 
virtually all mainstream newspapers and TV-shows in Europe. 
Across the Atlantic, the book has been hardly noted, although 
it is available in English and was reviewed by TIME Magazine 
[1]. So far, it sells mainly on the east coast, where America is 
similar to Europe. 
One reason might be that the author, a French professor is 
counted as slightly left-wing. Nevertheless, Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century is a best-seller in many countries and at 
Amazon.com. The huge public interest, measured by Google 
Trends in Figure 1, demonstrates that topics such as rising 
income inequalities and the unsoundness of capitalism have 
the potential to influence modern societies in the wake of the 
financial crisis. 
In the next section, I describe the key findings and discuss 
the most important implications. Section 3, concludes the 
paper. 
2. Results and Discussion 
The main theme of the book is the study of different forms 
of capital, income and wealth inequalities over time and across 
countries [2]. Piketty attempts to explain the evolution of the 
upper, the middle and lower class. It is needless to say that the 
definition of income classes can be criticized. Of course, this 
is not the main point because definitions are neither right nor 
wrong – they just have to be applicable. The definition used by 
Piketty is definitely practicable to support his argument in 
growing inequalities. 
The book asserts that the capital and wealth inequality is 
less distinct today than 100 years ago (before World War I), 
but nowadays the inequality level is reverting to that in earlier 
times. He demonstrates that the main driver of inequality is a 
simple economic relationship between the real rate of return (r) 
and the output growth rate (g). Provided that r is greater than g, 
Piketty argues that the concentration of capital significantly 
increases over time. Moreover, he confirms that the mitigated 
inequality level in the 1950s is ‘largely a consequence of 
accidental events (the shocks of 1914-1945, [the two World 
Wars]) and specific institutions such as taxation of capital and 
its income’ (Piketty, p. 376, [3]). This message is undisputed 
in economics. 
But what is really new in the book and what has triggered 
this enormous interest? And even more importantly, can we 
learn anything from it? The following paper is not a standard 
book review. It is a book review that emphasizes the 
psychological and behavioral aspects the book is lacking. 
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Hence, I intend to focus on the lessons from the book for the ‘Eurozone Crisis’. 
 
Source: Google Data, own computations. 
Figure 1. Google Trends Statistics for Thomas Piketty, 2004-2014 
2.1. Popularity of the Book 
First of all, Piketty’s book is based on a scientific approach 
and uses unique time series over two centuries. Except from 
his normative statements in Part IV of the book, the book is 
written in an unbiased manner. Moreover, Piketty is quite 
frank about data limitations and potential errors. There are 
many interesting findings. The long-run empirical time series 
are impressive, providing interesting insights on, for example, 
the limits of the life-cycle saving hypotheses of 
Modigliani-Miller (chapter 11), and thus the importance of 
psychological and behavioral elements in economics. 
Moreover, he demonstrates the limited validity of the 
productivity law (chapter 6 & 9) in terms of wage payments 
over the income distribution. 
Obviously, the second secret of Piketty’s success is that he 
avoids sophisticated mathematical equations or models. In my 
opinion, however, it is a weakness of the book because it lacks 
the theoretical underpinning of empirical facts. Consequently, 
Piketty’s forecasts of future economic developments are 
nothing else than reading a crystal ball. Moreover, he mainly 
concentrates on standard theories developed by Robert Solow 
in the 1950s, neglecting what endogenous growth theory is 
taking into account or the new developments in behavioral 
economics. In addition, he does not discuss behavioral 
macroeconomics [4] with heterogeneous agents or the theory 
of new economic geography [5,6]. This is even more 
surprising because Piketty criticizes the ‘so-called 
representative agent model’ in economic theory several times 
(p. 135ff, [3]). His critique is even less convincing because 
Piketty himself often uses average numbers for proving 
propositions in the book. Finally, Chapter 16 discussing ‘The 
Question of the Public Debt’ is definitely the weakest part of 
the book because it is mainly unscientific and somewhat 
‘general store’ like. He is neither an expert in monetary 
economics nor macroeconomics, and thus any of his ideas 
emphasizing to counteract the Eurozone crisis is short-sighted, 
such as the unfledged idea of debt mutualisation. If he had 
studied his proposal with the same rigor as he did on the global 
tax on capital, he would have immediately realized that it 
would harm the poor in favor of the rich, which is contrary to 
the primary message of the book. Unfortunately, Piketty failed 
to understand that ‘structural’ policy failures cannot be 
resolved by unlimited liquidity from governments or central 
banks rather by reforms [7]. 
The third secret of the book is the timing of the publication. 
Not only has it benefited from the recent financial crisis which 
started questioning capitalism, but also the fact that we are 
currently living in a world, in which the top ten percent of 
households in almost all advanced countries own 
approximately 60 to 70 percent of the total capital, contributed 
to the success of this book. Those inequality levels are too 
immense even for tolerant Americans and conservative 
Europeans. 
Last but not least, it is the right time because the empirical 
analysis provides insights on the ongoing Eurozone crisis. To 
put it in a nutshell, the book is published in an unprecedented 
environment of high inequalities, uncertainties, and 
imbalances in Europe and the world. All in all, this explains 
the public popularity of the book. 
2.2. Piketty’s View on the Eurozone Crisis 
Next, let me draw lessons for the Eurozone crisis from 
Piketty’s work. In my view, the most striking finding of the 
book on Europe is not written in Chapter 16, which is about 
the Eurozone. Instead let us look to Figure 5.3, in chapter 5 of 
the book. Piketty shows the different levels of private capital 
in relationship to national income across the major advanced 
countries (Figure 2). What can we learn from this Figure, apart 
from Piketty’s interpretation on increasing concentration of 
private capital in almost all countries? 
First of all, we have to keep in mind that the origin of the 
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Eurozone crisis has mainly emerged due to macroeconomic 
imbalances, hence a divergence in competitiveness. Normally, 
current account imbalances can be eliminated via adjustments 
of the bilateral exchange rate. However, in a monetary union, 
the exchange rates are irrevocably fixed. Consequently, the 
only feasible mechanism is an immediate price and/or wage 
adjustment. This may eliminate the imbalances and close the 
competitiveness gap. However, this policy response is 
sometimes painful for ordinary citizens in deficit countries. 
Moreover, wage cuts alone cannot restore competitiveness and 
confidence in an economy. At the same time a current account 
deficit country has to enforce structural reforms to get the 
economy back on track as soon as possible. But policymakers 
delay those policy measures, such as wage cuts and structural 
reforms at any time, due to the well-known political business 
cycle [8]. This observation is an unambiguous lesson after 
more than ten years of the European Monetary Union and the 
history of economics [9]. Obviously, these two policy 
measures are often judged as one-sided and therefore disputed 
especially in current account deficit countries such as France, 
Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal. Indeed, these countries 
demand that surplus countries should increase wages and 
prices at the same time to reduce their competitiveness. 
In general, both arguments are economically effective. But 
the book provides insights that the current approach in Europe 
imposed by surplus countries is more valid and just. In other 
words, the continuation of austerity is not only appropriate, it 
is even better to counteract the current challenges in respect of 
increasing inequalities within and across Eurozone countries. 
This evidence is even supported by the recent annual report of 
the independent and highly regarded German Council of 
Economic Experts [10]. 
 
Source: Thomas Piketty, 2013. 
Figure 2. Capital/Income Ratio Over The Long Run 
The argument of surplus countries –of course Germany, 
first in line– is as follows: austerity measures in deficit 
countries are needed to regain international competitiveness in 
the Eurozone as a whole. The Eurozone competes not merely 
internally rather with America and Asia. Therefore, current 
account deficit countries have to cut prices and wages, and not 
the other way around. This economic argument is supported 
by the most recent economic findings [10]. Simultaneously, as 
long as deficit countries cut prices and wages as well as 
implement reforms, the Eurozone surplus countries assist via 
European rescue facilities, such as the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM). Furthermore, current account deficit 
countries under European rescue programs obtain additional 
support from new monetary policy measures by the European 
Central Bank (ECB). This sounds like and is a balanced and 
prudent strategy. However, some people in both surplus and 
deficit countries reject this balanced approach. A reason for 
this rejection behavior has to do with typical human heuristics 
and biases in decision-making under uncertainty. These 
decision-making paradoxes were already discovered by 
Kahnemann and Tversky [11] decades ago. 
2.3. Piketty’s Contradictions 
Not surprisingly, Piketty himself refuses the current rescue 
strategy in the book. However, he argues against all scientific 
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evidence presented in the first two parts of his book. In 
addition, the balanced approach is in line with recent findings 
in economics [7,10,14] and psychology and behavioral 
sciences [4,11]. 
Let me briefly elaborate this point for the Eurozone crisis. 
When the European Monetary Union (EMU) was established, 
the real interest rate was negative in almost all current account 
deficit countries of today. That implies that, in the past 10 
years, these countries have accumulated massive investments 
and future wealth. This is literally the true source of the 
Eurozone crisis and the rising inequalities within and across 
Eurozone countries (Figure 2). The development of the private 
capital levels in Italy and France as examples for two large 
deficit countries, and Germany as a surplus country is well 
represented in Figure 2. Three distinct patterns can be 
identified in almost all graphs in Piketty’s book over the past 
40 years: i) similar capital inequality levels before 1990, ii) 
rising capital inequalities in the convergence phase from 1990 
to 1998, and iii) finally divergence since the currency union in 
1999. The real estate bubble in some deficit countries such as 
Spain is just another proof. At that time, Germany had the 
lowest output growth and the highest unemployment rate in 
Europe, particularly in the period between 2000 and 2005. 
Without any help from other Eurozone countries, the German 
government imposed reforms in the labor and goods market. 
Now, almost 10 years later, Germany is benefiting from these 
and many other reforms over the past decade in terms of 
competitiveness and economic growth. On the flip side of the 
positive economic development in Germany of today, the real 
wage is lower than 10 years ago and Germany has the largest 
low-income sector in Europe. 
The empirical evidence on rising inequalities across deficit 
and surplus countries adds an important fact to a controversial 
debate in the Eurozone. Unfortunately, Piketty does not study 
this issue in the book explicitly. Consequently, it is a fair 
request of the domestic taxpayers in surplus countries that 
deficit countries should pay their own bill for the past 
(domestic) policy failures. It is strange that Piketty never 
mentions this fact in the book at all. Instead, he uses 
ideological glasses such as a policymaker who would never 
admit an own policy failure and instead blames Europe or 
other countries. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show that Germany is 
less wealthy than any other European country even in the 
long-run. This fact is also proven in other studies by the 
European Central Bank [12] and Kalckreuth et al. [13] (Figure 
3). 
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Source: ECB [1], 2013. 
Figure 3. Level of Median Net Wealth in Euro Area Countries 
The ECB [12] finds that the median and mean net wealth of 
euro area households is 109 200 Euro and 230 800 Euro 
respectively. The substantial difference between both numbers 
is explained by the uneven distribution of wealth within 
countries. In addition, the ECB explains the difference in 
household net wealth across countries as follows [12]: “…the 
two countries with a homeownership rate below 50%, namely 
Germany and Austria, the “median” household does not own 
the main residence and has substantially lower wealth than 
the median household in countries where the homeownership 
is above 50% (…).” This evidence supports my argument that 
crude policy demands from current account surplus or 
presumably rich countries do not necessarily reduce income 
and wealth inequalities. As a matter of fact, Piketty’s idea of 
debt mutualisation does not tackle the structural economic 
problems within some of the Eurozone member states, such as 
Psychology and Behavioral Sciences 2014; 3(6): 207-211  211 
 
France and Italy. 
It is remarkable that Germany is immediately seen even in 
Piketty’s eyes, just after a few good years but with painful 
reforms a decade ago, as Europe’s richest economy. 
Admittedly the GDP growth and income per capita is high in 
comparison to most of the other Euro area member states after 
the great recession of 2009. But at the same time, the rich 
states are sometimes lagging behind in terms of wealth levels 
and the degree of inequality, as confirmed in the book. 
Therefore, the preceding successful years are not a result of 
German strength rather a result of bold labor market reforms 
enforced by a left-wing government in office at that time. 
Thus, tackling the Eurozone crisis with a mixture of austerity 
and reforms, as Germany did it 10 years ago, seems to be a 
balanced as well as ‘left-wing’ approach [14]. Consequently, 
at present the Eurozone surplus countries are doing well due to 
past and bold reforms, which other countries have been 
postponing for several years. Hence, today, deficit countries 
are paying the bill for their own policy failures and ignorance. 
Even Piketty realizes this issue while studying the data. He 
attempts to relativize this finding by comparing rich and poor 
countries at the end of the book (p. 465ff., [3]), unfortunately 
this subsection does not convince an informed reader. 
3. Conclusion 
In summary, Part I and Part II of the book ‘Capital In The 
Twenty-First Century’ are a stimulating source for the debate 
about rising inequalities and the future of Europe. However, 
the book lacks on a theoretical foundation especially in respect 
of psychological and behavioral elements. Moreover, the 
demand for debt mutualisation and easing austerity in Part IV 
of the book, would be foolish, socially and economically 
short-sighted, and unjust at the same time. Nevertheless, other 
proposals in the book such as the global tax on capital are well 
established. As a result, Piketty's work is not just a book on 
inequalities. It is a remarkable study that sheds light on 
long-run inequalities and social imbalances across different 
times and spaces. Thus, it provides interesting lessons for 
modern democracies’ in America and Europe alike. 
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